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.ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this essay is to explain a new theory of 
perfect competition that synthesizes the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie and 
Marshallian theories and summarizes the recent work of a large 
number of researchers. The synthetic theory provides a logically 
precis.e general equilibrium framework that can be used both for 
pos.i. analysis as well as to form a basis for the classical 
theorems of welfare economics.; in these aspects it follows the 
ADM theory. However, as in the }farshallian theory, there is free­
entry in the form of an unbounded pool of firms which have access 
to the existing technology. Also as in the Marshallian theory, the 
averaie cost curves available to each firm are U-shaped. 
In contrast to both the Marshallian and the ADM theories, 
we do not take price taking as. a h_¥Pothesis. We use the term 
":perfect competition" to des·cribe a si.tuation in which firms are 
arhitrarily small relative to the markets in which they are involved. 
The firms. in our model correctly perceive the effect of the amount 
that they place on the market on prices and they act to maximize 
profit wi. th.:Ls in mind. "Perfectly competitive equilibria" are 
defined as the limit points of equilibria as firms become small 
relative to the market, and followin� Cournot, we observe that as 
firms become small their abili.ty-1, to influence· price disappears. 
A new condition is identified which is important for the 
viability of competitive markets. Loosely speaking, this 
condition requires that prices provide the proper entry signals 
for firms. If one thinks of each firm as associated with the use 
of an unpriced and nondivisible resource, sometimes referred to as 
entrepreneurship, then in equilibrium the returns to that factor 
must fall with entry and rise with exit. Not only the stability 
theorems of the synthetic theory but also the existence theorem 
reject the application of the competitive model to a regime in 
which entry drives up (and exit reduces} the profit of similar 
firms. 
GENERAL EQUILIBRlUM WITH. FR.EE ENTRY: A SYNTHETIC 
APPROACH TO THE THEORY OF PERFECT COMPETITION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental axiom of perfect competition is price taking behavior; 
however, within this framework tvo strikingly different theories are advanced. 
These are referred to as the Marshallian Theory and the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie 
Theory. The Marshallian Theory is emphasized at the undergraduate level. It 
conjures up images of blackboards filled with partial equilibrimn diagrams, 
and it ·is what Chicagoans refer to when they speak of ''bread and butter" 
economics. The Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie Theory, herea�er referred to as the ADM 
theory, is primarily reserved for our more advanced students.
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It is the 
dominant framework of ''highbrow theorists," and its most important application 
is to the classical theorems of welfare economics. During the first half of 
this century, the Marshallian Theory was unquestionably the leading theory of 
value. This probably remains true today. However, a growing nmnber of papers 
in the applied areas; for example, finance, international trade, and monetary 
theory adopt a variant of the ADM framework. 
One must acknowledge that the Marshallian and ADM theories have many 
striking and essential differences, for example: 
(i) In the ADM theory a finite nmnber of firms are ·specified in advance, 
while in the Harshallian theory there is normally a pool of firms, which have 
free access to the_existing technology, and are ready to enter when the conditions 
become right. 
(ii) In the ADM theory the technology of each firm is convex, while in 
the Harshallian theory the average cost curve of each firm is U-shaped. 
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(iii) In the ADM theory price-taking is assumed independent of the number 
of firms, while in Marshallian theory price taking is assumed only for an 
environment in which efficient scale is small relative to demand, and, as a 
consequence, there are many firms. 
(iv) ADM theory is general equilibrium, and looks toward the classical 
theorems of welfare economics while moat of Marshallian analysis ignores 
intermarket effects. 
(v) Finally, the ADM theor:r is. static, and the major attempt to introduce 
a dynamics via a tatonnement has not been very successful. In contrast, the 
Marshallian analysis has an essentially dynami� aspect, and this aspect requires 
that a process of entry is at rest in the equilibrium. 
The purpose of this essay is to explain a new theory of perfect competition; 
one that synthesizes the ADM and Marshallian theories and may be viewed as summar­
izing the recent work of a large numher of researchers; for example, Hart [1979], 
Novshek 11980], Novshek and Sonnenachein 11978), and others. (See the symposium 
issue [1980] and the references therein.) The synthetic theory provides a logically 
precise_ general equilibrium framework that can be used both for positive analysis 
as well as to form a basis for the classical theorems of welfare economics; in 
these aspects it follows the ADM theory. However, as in the Marshallian theory, 
there is free-entry in the form of an unbounded pool of firms which have access 
to the existing technol_ogy. Also as in the Marshallian theory, the average cost 
curves available to each firm are U-shaped. 
In contrast to both the Marshallian and the ADM theories, we do not take 
price taking as a hypothesis. Rather, we integrate into our analysis the leading 
classical explanation for price taki_ng behavior. We use the term "perfect comp­
etition" to describe a situation in which firms are arbitrarily small relative to 
the markets in which they are involved. The firms in our model correctly perceive 
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the effect of the amount that they place on the market on pfices and they act 
to maximize profit with this in mind. ''Perfectly competitive equilibria" are 
defined as the limit points of equilibria as firms become small relative to the 
market, and following Cournot, we observe that as firms become small their 
2 abil.ity to influence price disappears. 
A new condition is identified which is important for the viability of 
competitive markets. Loosely speaking, this condition requires that prices 
provide the proper entry signals for firms, and is a consequence of the essentially • 
dynamic aspect of Marshallian analysis. If one thinks of each firm as associated 
with the use of an unpriced and nondivisible resource, sometimes referred to as 
entrepreneurship, then in equilibrium the returns to that factor must fall with 
entry and rise with exit. Not only the stability theorems of the synthetic theory 
but also the existence theorem reject the application of the competitive model 
to a regime in which entry drives up ( and exit reduces) the profit of similar 
firms. 
II. THE ADM AND MARSHALLIAN MODELS 
It is useful to begin by presenting stylized versions of the ADM and 
Marshallian models. We will use these simple versions to explain more carefully 
the relation between the ADM and Marshallian theories and to list the features 
that are desired in our synthesis. 
A. A Stylized Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie Model 
Our development follows T. Koopmans' classic exposition of a Robinson­
Crusoe economy [1957]. Robinson produces food using his labor, and to simplify 
matters we assume that production takes place according to constant "returns to 
scale. Employing a convention of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie theory, labor input 
is denoted as a negative quantity and food output is denoted as a positive quantity. 
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The technology is SUllDDarized in Figure 1, where by a choice of units, one unit 
of labor input yields one unit of food output. Robinson has 24 hours of labor 
to offer; this represents his entire initial endowment of resources. When his 
labor is added to the technology set one obtains the set T of possible aggregate 
supplies. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
Robinson's preferences are indicated by indifference curves, which connect 
equally preferred combinations of food and retained labor. In the economy of 
Figure 1, there is a unique "best attainable point," which we have denoted by x. 
A price system is a non-zero vector that lies in the first quadrant; 
it defines the value of each bundle ( 1,f) in the usual manner. Given the price 
system (1,1), the vector x = (t,f) maximizes the value of supply and this value 
is 21{.. Observe that (t,f) is not the unique maximizer, since each point on the 
northeast boundary of T has the same value. If the value of the supply action 
is distributed to Robinson, then at prices (1,1) he will be able to afford bundles 
in the first orthant that satisfy the budget inequality p1t + p� � 21{.. Robinson's 
utility maximizing demand action is then (t,f), and so at prices (1,1) there is 
a profit maximizing supply and a utility maximizing demand which coincide. 
It is quite apparent that this is the unique equilibrium for the ADM model. If 
the technology set is interpreted as that available to a competitive firm, and 
if the economy is interpreted as a private ownership economy in which Robinson 
owns both the firm and the single scarce input labor, then one has the following 
description of the equilibrium: At prices (1,1) the firm takes these prices as 
given and maximizes profit by purchasing 21{.-t units of labor and producing 24-T
units of food. It pays 21{.-t for the labor and sells the food for 21{.-t, making 
zero profit. Robinson receives no dividends from his ownership of the firm; 
however, as a holder of labor resource he receives offers for all 24 units and 
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thus derives an income of 24. These offers come from the firm (24-t units) and 
from himself viewed as a conswner (t units). Finally , as a conswner , Robinson 
uses his 24 units of income to purchase I units of his own labor (that is , he 
buys leisure) and f = 24 - I units of food. Both markets clear and all accounts 
balance .  
This i s  general equilibriwn because the interaction between markets is 
emphasized; for example , the wage determines not only the supply of labor , but 
also the demand for food through its effect on both the relative price of leisure 
and food and the value of Robinson's initial endowment of labor. The model was 
developed with the classical theorems of welfare economics in mind , and it has 
been skillfully employed to determine precise conditions under which a) every 
equilibrium is a Pareto optimum, and b) every Pareto optimwn is an equilibrium 
after a suitable redistribution of ownership. 
We emphasize that the ADM model does not concern itself with the plausibility 
of price-taking behavior. The model offers descriptions of perfect competition 
for situations i'l which bilateral monopoly (one conswner and one producer) or 
single agent maximization (Robinson) should apply. 
B.  A Stylized Mll'shallian Model 
We begin Nith a familiar textbook figure (Figure 2) with average cost , 
marginal cost , and demand labelled AC , MC , and FF respectively. All firms are 
identical and the number of firms is fixed at 5 .  The aggregate supply is zero 
up to price p* (= minimum AC); at p* supply is the indicated five point set , 
and above p* supply is the horizontal swn of the marginal cost curves. 
[Figure 2 around here] 
Observe that if the technology represented by AC is freely available to 
additional firms , then the aggregate supply in the figure does not describe a 
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situation in which firms take prices as given and maximize profit . This is because 
at any price above p* it is possible for any firm in the market to make a 
positive profit , and so all firms should be active. Clearly , with free entry , 
an exact price-taking equilibriwn will exist only in the unlikely event that the 
value of inverse demand at price p* is an integral multiple of the minimum 
average cost quantity. In Marshallian analysis this observation is minimized , and 
equilibriwn is taken to represent a situation in which each active firm is 
maximizing profit (p = MC) and the number of firms is right in the sense that 
there is not much incentive for firms to enter or leave . It is the latter 
aspect that gives Marshallian analysis a dynamic flavor. 
Marshall applies his model of perfect competition when efficient scale 
(minimum average cost output) is small relative to demand. This is not only the 
case in which there is especially strong justification for the price-taking 
assumption, but in addition , it is the case in which the horizontal gaps in the 
value of supply at price p* become small relative to demand. When efficient 
scale is small relative to demand , one is able to simultaneously have active firms 
maximizing profit and the number of active firms chosen so that the incentive 
for inactive firms to enter is very small . The price in the market will be a bit 
above p* • Alternatively , one can consider an approximate equilibriwn at price 
p* , in which a finite number of firms are active and maximizing profit by offering 
the efficient scale output to the market, and demand very nearly matches supply. 
This is illustrated in Figure 3a. 
[Figure 3a and 3b around here] 
In Figure 3b the efficient scale of each firm is the infinitesimal quantity 
M and there is an unbounded mass of available firms. Let D be demand at 
prices p* , then an exact equilibriwn is achieved by having a mass * of firms 
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active, each producing at efficient scale M • Clearly Figure 3b represents a 
natural limit of markets of the type considered in Figure 3a as efficient scale 
becomes small relative to demand. In the equilibrium of Figure 3b there is a 
continuum of active firms. 
c. The Beginnings of the Synthesis 
Let us first place the Marshallian model in the framework of the ADM 
theory. This is done to demonstrate that the framework of the ADM theory is 
sufficiently rich so as to enable us to capture the Marshallian ideas described 
above. The U-shaped average cost leads to the firm technology represented in 
the second quadrant of Figure 4. By sl.DIDDing this technology a countable infinity 
[Figure 4 around here] 
of times and using the initial endowment, the feasible set of aggregate supplies 
takes the form of the set denoted by T • If the indifference curves are as 
indicated in the first quadrant of Figure 4, then there will be no price-taking 
equilibrium. To see this observe that the only price systems that lead to a 
positive output of food at a profit maximum are of the form (p,p). (Without 
loss of generality we will assume p = 1. ) But at prices (1,1) demand is z , 
while profit maximizing supply must take on one of the values {(24,0) , (24-1,1) , 
(24-2,2) • • •  }. In particular, observe that the "best attainable point" x is 
not an equilibrium of the system. 
It is clear that by limiting the number of firms to five (as in the 
Marshallian example), we can find a price system (l,l+c), at which supply equals 
demand and there is not much incentive for the excluded firms to enter. Furthermore, 
the associated allocation is close to the "best point" x • This is 
illustrated in Figure S. 
[Figure 5 around here] 
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Alternatively, at prices (1,1) , we could consider an approximate price­
taking equilibrium in which a finite number of firms are active and maximizing 
profit by offering the efficient scale output to the market, and demand very 
nearly matches supply. This is essentially illustrated in Figure 4, when the gap 
between SS and z is small. Once again, observe that demand is close to the 
''best point" x • 
In Figure 6 the efficient scale of each firm is an infinitesimal quantity 
and there is an unbounded mass of available firms. As in the Marshallian 
Figure 3b, an exact equilibrium at prices (1,1) is achieved when one properly 
chooses the mass of active firms and has them each produce at efficient scale . 
Clearly Figure 6 represents a natural limit of markets of the type considered in 
Figure 4. Observe the similarity with the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie Figure 1. Also 
observe that the equilibrium and the ''best point" coincide. 
[Figure 6 around here] 
D. An Outline of the Approach 
The synthetic theory begins with the above ideas and develops them into a 
well-specified model. As in the Marshallian theory, we assume that there is 
free entry and that firms have nonconvex technologies. A perfectly competitive 
economy is a sequence of economies {€,(�)} in which firms become arbitrarily 
small relative to the markets in which they are involved .  The limit o f  the 
sequence is denoted by £(0), and in the limit economy firms are infinitesimal. 
In each economy of the sequence {€(�)} firms are assumed to correctly perceive 
the (typically non-negligible) effect of the amount that they place on the market 
on prices, and they act to maximize profit . We have seen above that non­
convexities in the production sets of firms lead to generic non-existence of 
price-taking equilibrium. Fortunately, when efficient scale is small relative 
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t o  demand, i t  turn s  out that Cournot equilibrium with entry frequently exists 
for the Marshallian model. An equilibrium for the perfectly competitive sequence 
{€(�)} is naturally defined as the limit of Cournot equilibria of {((�)}. 
In other words, perfectly competitive equilibrium is defined as the limit of 
Cournot equilibria with entry as firms become small relative to the market. 
As one might expect, it is possible to characterize the perfectly competitive 
equilibria of {€(�)} in terms of its limit economy �O). The main theorems 
of this essay concern this characterization and show, in particular, that the 
actions of firms in perfectly competitive equilibrium are "as if" they were 
price takers in £co). On the other hand, these theorems also show that there 
are price-taking equilibria of €Co) which are not the limit of Cournot equilibria 
with entry, and thus not perfectly competitive equilibria. 
III. THE PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM SYNTHESIS 
In this section we develop the notion of a perfectly competitive sequence 
of partial equilibrium markets. This is a sequence of Marshallian markets in which 
there is a single homogeneous good and firms decrease in size relative to the 
market. As was suggested above, we define a perfectly competitive equilibrium 
as the limit of Cournot quantity setting equilibria with entry of the markets in 
the sequence. 
Let us begin by returning to the Marshallian specification as in Figure 2. 
In order to simplify the analysis we assume some special structure for the cost 
function C(y), 
(C) C(y) o, if y = o, and 
C(y) = C0 + V(y) if y > 0 , 
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where C0 > O, and for all y 
uniquely at y = 1 
> O, v' > O, v" > 0 • Average cost is minimized 
For the inverse demand function F(y), we assume 
(F) F E  c
2
([o,m)); that is, F is twice continuously differentiable 
and F(y) = C(l) implies F'(y) � O. These are regularity conditions. 
[Figure 7 around here] 
(C,F) specifies the basic Marshallian market. We interpret there to be a 
countable infinity of firms with access to the cost function C • 
A perfectly competitive sequence of matj<:ets {M(�)} is a sequence of 
markets in which the size of firms changes relative to the market. An a size 
firm corresponding to C is a firm with cost function C0(y) = aC(y/a). For 
each a >  O, C, F, one considers a market with a countable infinity of firms 
with technology c a facing market inverse demand F; this market is denoted 
by M(a). As a+ 0 , firms become smaller relative to the market (for an a size 
firm average cost is AC0(y) = AC1(y/a) and an a size firm attains minimum 
average cost uniquely at output a), and the aggregate production possibilities 
in the market converge to the constant returns to scale case diagrammed in 
Figures 3b and 6. Given the cost function C and the inverse demand function 
F , a competitive sequence is defined by any {�} ;=l C:. (0,1] such that 
ak + O The limit market is denoted by M(O). 
In the Cournot theory quantities are the strategic variables. Cournot 
equilibrium requires that the quantity actions of firms maximize profit given 
the quantity actions of all other firms. In particular, this implies that in 
an equilibrium no firm makes negative profit, since it could leave the market 
and make zero profit. Similarly, equilibrium requires that no firm can enter 
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the market and make a positive profit. Stated precisely, a Cournot equilibrium 
with entry for the market M(a) is an integer n and a set of positive outputs 
(y1,y2, • • •  ,yn
) such that: 
(a) {y1,y2, • • •  ,yn} is an n-firm Cournot equilibrium (without entry); that 
is, for all i=l,2, • • •  ,n, 
for all y � O , and 
F( t y.+y.)y. - C (y.) � F( t y. + y)y - C (y) 
j;!i 
J 1 1 a 1 j;!i J a 
n 
(b) entry is not profitable; that is, F( t y. + y)y - C (y) S 0 for all 
j=l J a 
y il:_ 0 • 
Observe that Cournot equilibrium with entry is an "exact" equilibrium notion. 
In equilibrium, firms maximize profit and supply equals demand. 
Finally, we define the equilibria of the perfectly competitive sequence 
{M(�)} as the limit of ty i (�) where Cy1 Cak) • • • • ,yn (°\.:))is a Cournot 
equilibr.iunwith entry of the market M(C\_) These are called perfectly 
competitive equilibria. 
Theorem l characterizes the perfectly competitive equilibria for a 
sequence {M(�)}. It shows that they can be identified by the conditions 
"demand price equals minimum per unit cost" and "demand slopes downward" in the 
limit market M(O). The number of active firms is endogenously determined by 
free entry and exit. Average cost curves are U-shaped (and so firm technology 
is not convex). Price-taking behavior is not a primitive of the theory; rather, 
the ability of a firm to effect price becomes arbitrarily small. Equilibrium 
is exact, with both production equals demand and all firms maximizing profit. 
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Theorem l (Novshek):3 Given the cost function C satisfying (C), the inverse 
demand function F satisfying (F), and the "perfectly competitive sequence 
{M(�)}, the following conditions are equivalent: 
(la) y* is a perfectly competitive equilibrium for {M(ak)}, and 
(lb) F(y*) C (l) and F'(y*) < 0 • 
For the case of partial equilibrium, the preceding result describes 
precisely our approach to perfect competition. Perfectly competitive equilibria 
are defined as the limit points of Cournot equilibria of the Marshallian 
markets {M(�)}. 
Novshek's characterization theorem establishes that these perfectly 
competitive equilibria are the quantities in M(O) that (a) equate the inverse 
demand price of consumers and minimum average cost, and (b) satisfy the condition 
that demand is downward sloping. For the case·of globally downward sloping 
demand, the perfectly competitive equilibria. of the sequence {·M(�)} are 
identified with the unique Walrasian equilibrium in the derived constant returns 
to scale market M(O). But· if inverse demand is not globally dowr5'ard sloping, 
there may be Walrasian equilibria of the derived (constant returns to scale in the 
aggregate) economy £co) that are not by our definition competitive equilibria. 
This is due to the requirement in our analysis, that for equilibrium the process 
of entry must be at rest. 
In Figure 7, the points y* and y** are equilibria of the perfectly 
competitive sequence {M(�)}, but y is not, despite the fact that the demand 
price of consumers and minimum average cost coincide at y • We argue that y 
is not an equilibrium because an infinitesimal firm in M(O) can enter and make 
a positive profit. To make this precise we observe first that in any Cournot 
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equilibrium for the market M(a) all firms must make non-negative profit so 
aggregate output must lie in· [O,y*] or [y y**J. Second, inactive firms must 
not be able to profit from switching to minimum average cost production, a , 
so aggregate Cournot equilibrium output plus a must lie in [y*,y] or [y**,=). 
Thus the aggregate output in a Cournot equilibrium must lie in either the 
interval [y*-a,y*] or [y**-a, y**]. For small a neither interval is near y 
in fact this is how one proves la implies 1.b. The hard part of the theorem is to 
show that for a sufficiently small, if F(y*) = C(l) and F'(y*) < O , then M(a) 
has a Cournot equilibrium with entry with aggregate output in [y*-a,y*]. 
The above argument makes it clear why the equilibrium concept we put 
forth leads to a different theory than does the notion of Walrasian equilibrium 
in the limit economy. In the Walrasian theory firms are assumed to take prices 
as given, and in perfect competition we justify this as an approximation. 
The approximation applies when firms are small relative to the market, and thus 
have little influence in most any specification of strategic variables. In our 
analysis, the ability of each firm to affect price becomes small; however, each 
firm will normally have some effect, and if the entry of a firm will drive up 
price and make entry profitable, then firms will understand this effect and enter. 
Because we model perfect competition as a situation in which small firms 
correctly perceive their influence, equilibrium requires that no firm can drive 
up prices by entering. 
IV. THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL, PRELIMINARIES 
In this section we present the general equilibrium model that provides 
the basis for our concept of perfectly competitive equilibrium. 
lll-. 
We consider a perfectly competitive sequence of economies {f(a)}, aE (O,l].
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As a converges to 0 firms become arbitrarily small relative to the economy, 
and in the limit economy, EJ:o), firms are infinitesimal. For aE (0,1], 
each economy £ca) has a countable infinity of firms available. This provides 
our notion of free entry: in any equilibrium for �(a) only a finite number 
of firms can be active, so additional inactive firms are always available to test 
the profitability of entry. The process of entry is at rest if none of the inactive 
firms could gain positive profit by being active. 
In each economy (Ca), firms are the only strategic agents and pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium in quantities is the solution concept. As in Marshall, 
we treat consumers as a competitive, price-taking sector to focus on the role of 
firms and entry. In the Cournot tradition, quantity setting provides a tractable 
basis for our analysis and avoids the obvious problem of nonexistence which arises 
when using price setting with nonconvex technologies. Pure strategies are used 
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because of their natural appeal. When firms consider a quantity action (a vector 
of input and output levels) they evaluate the corresponding profit using an 
"inverse
.
demand" function F. To each vector of quantity actions of all firms, y, 
the "inverse demand" function associates a price vector, p, such that the 
competitive consumer sector's excess demand given prices, p, and the income 
generated by the consumers' dividend payments (their fraction of the profit or 
loss for each firm j, p·yj) exactly matches the aggregate quantity action of 
the firms. Hence the payoff for the jth firm is a well defined function of its 
own strategy, yj , and the strategies of other firms, 
of strateg�es played by the firms, all markets clear, 
6 Y).( • For any vector 
J 
though some firms may be 
making losses, and in general, firms are not profit maximizing. The firms are 
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in Cournot equilibrium if: (1) each firm's action is feasible (in its production 
set); and (2) each firm is maximizing profit given F and the actions of other 
firms. Because of nonconvex t�chnologies, only a finite number of firms have 
nonzero actions in equilibrium. Note that the entry process is at rest in an 
equilibrium: additional, inactive firms are available but cannot earn positive 
profit from entry. Thus we have a notion of Cournot equilibrium with free entry 
for each economy Eca), a&(O,l]. 
For each economy €"Ca), let C(a,F) be the set of aggregate firm actions 
corresponding to. Cournot equilibria of £ (a) relative to "inverse demand" F • 
The perfectly competitive equilibria of the sequence of economies <€Ca)} , 
a &  (O,l] are defined to be the limit points of robust sequences of Cournot 
equili.15ria7of the E:Ca) economies; i.e. , (p*,y*) is a perfectly competitive 
equilibrium of the sequence <ECa)} if there exists (1) an "inverse demand" 
selection F which is continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of y* 
and satisfies F(y*) = p* , (2) a strictly decreasing sequence {ar};=l <:: (O,l] 
which converge� to zero and (3) for each 
output for C(o.), y(a) & C(a,F) such that 
a & U [a2r,a2r_1
J an equilibrium 
r=l 
y(a) converges to y* as a converges 
to zero (a var·ying over ·u [a2r,a2r_1J only). Since a2r < a2r-l each r=l 
interval [a2r,a2r_1
J is nondegenerate and the perfectly competitive equilibria 
of the sequence are limit points of truly robust sequences of Cournot equilibria. 
This framework allows us to analyze a logically precise general 
equilibrium model with nonconvex technologies and endogenous determination of 
the number of active firms. Despite the nonconvex technologies, the equilibria 
are exact rather than approximate equilibria. Price taking behavior has not been 
assumed; rather, when a converges to zero the ability of a firm to affect price 
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becomes arbitrarily small. At any perfectly competitive equilibrium of the 
sequence, equilibrium production maximizes profit relative to the equilibrium 
prices. Firms' actions are as if firms were price takers (Theorem 2). The 
standard welfare theorems still hold in this framework: every perfectly 
competitive equilibrium of the sequence is Pareto optimal (Theorem �) and every 
Pareto optimal allocation for the sequence can be supported as a perfectly 
competitive equilibrium of the sequence (Theorem 5 ) .  However, since the process 
of entry must be at rest in an equilibrium, prices, as determined by the "inverse 
demand" functions F, must give correct entry signals. This introduces a new 
condition which we will call DSD, for the existence of a perfectly competitive 
equilibrium of the sequence. Every perfectly competitive equilibrium of the 
sequence satisfies weak DSD (Theorem 2). This condition is not part of the 
Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model and there are perfectly competitive sequences of 
(private ownership) economies with no perfectly competitive equilibrium in our 
sense but such that the limit economy, �O),has an Arrow-Debreu-HcKenzie 
equilibrium (see Section V). An allocation in E:,CO) which satisfies the standard 
Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie conditions for equilibrium and also satisfies strong DSD 
is a perfectly competitive equilibrium for the sequence (Theorem 3). If the 
consumer sector of €:(0) acts as a single consumer then the sequence, { E.Ca)} , 
has an equilibrium (Corollary 1). 
V. A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EXAMPLE IN WHICH PRICES 
GIVE THE WRONG ENTRY SIGNALS 
The characterization results for partial equilibrium in Section III 
depend�d on a condition of downward sloping demand. The results for general 
equilibrii.im depend on an analogous condition, called DSD. Prices determined 
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by the "inverse demand" selection F must give proper entry signals: at a 
point satisfying the ADM equilibrium conditions, additional entry must lead to 
new prices at which the entrants make losses. Since input and output prices 
change, the requirement is that the net effect of all the price changes leads 
to a loss for the entrant. 
Walras had something similar to DSD in mind (Walras (1874-7], p. 255 ): 
• • •  under free competition, if the selling price of a product 
exceeds the cost of the productive services for certain firms 
and a profit results, entrepreneurs will flow towards this 
branch of production or expand their output, so that the quantity 
of the product [on the market] will increase, its price will 
fall, and the difference between price and cost will be reduced; 
and, if [on the contrary], the cost of the productive 
services exceeds the selling price for certain firms, so that a 
loss results, entrepreneurs will leave this branch of production 
or curtail their output, so that the quantity of the product 
[on the market] will decrease, its price will rise and the 
difference between price and cost will again be reduced • • • •
The natural question to ask now is whether or not the presence of a perfectly 
competitive equilibrium for the sequence of economies {�a)} can be normally 
expected. We show, in the example below, that simple economies !::Co) exist 
(two consumers with homothetic preferences, and constant returns to scale) for 
which there is an ADM equilibrium but no perfectly competitive equilibrium of 
the sequence {C(a)} which converges to €(0). Because DSD does not hold, for 
all sufficiently small a, no economy e(a) will have a noncooperative equilibrium 
in pure quantity strategies that is close to the ADM equilibrium. (Recall the 
reason why y was not an equilibrium in Figure 7.) The relevance of the DSD 
condition should to some extent be measured by the plausibility that an economy 
will rest at such an ADM equilibrium. 
Consider an economy with two consumers or two types of consumers (A and B), 
two consumption conunodities (leisure and food), and a process which converts 
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one (small) unit of labor into one (small) unit of output (food). The use of a 
process requires a resource (e.g., land), all of which is owned by B (in an 
amount which does not effectively constrain the economy). We idealize the fact 
that the process is small in scale by defining the aggregate output as (-µ,µ), when 
a mass µ of processes now called firms, are active. Aggregate output (-µ,µ) 
means that µ (big) units of labor are supplied and converted into µ (big) units 
of food. Finally, for any output vector (-µ,µ) the price of food relative to 
labor is determined by the condition that the sum of demands of A (taking into 
account the value of his initial holding of labor) and B (taking into account 
the value of his holding of labor and the profit from the firms which he owns) 
equals the supply action (-µ,µ). 
Since labor can be converted into food on a one-to-one basis, ADM equilibrium 
requires that the price of food in terms of labor be one. At this price profits 
are zero, and the aggregate demand of consumers is met by the activity of an 
appropriate mass of small firms. All firms make zero profit, whether or not they 
are active. Now the punch line! This example, to be given an analytic form 
below, has the following disturbing feature at the unique ADM equilibrium. When 
firms are treated as infinitesimal (rather than as points), the entry of a firm 
will result in a lower price for labor relative to food, and yield profit for 
the entering firm. The additional labor which is required is obtained by lowering 
the wage (A's demand for both leisure and food falls, as his income (th� value 
of his labor) falls), and the additional food produced is demanded by B, whose 
income is augmented by the profits of the firms which he owns. Agent B demands 
more leisure and more food. Thus, from both the viewpoint of the preceding 
quotation (Walras), and the viewpoint of our concept of equilibrium of the 
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perfectly competitive sequence, the single ADM equilibrium cannot be expected 
to be an equilibrium state under competition! (For a subsequent purpose we 
include a parameter 9, which defines the fraction of each firm which is owned 
by A.) 
Example: In CCO) there are two commodities, two consumers, and one 
industry composed of a continuum of infinitesimal firms. Preferences and technology 
are shown in Figure 8. Agent A owns fraction 9 of each firm and agent B owns 
fraction 1-9. Each consumer also holds an endowment of one unit of labor, the 
numeraire good, which he can trade for food at price p. The unique ADM 
equilibrium for this economy, E;(O), has prices (1,1), consumption vectors 
(l/2,1/2) and (l/3,2/3), and aggregate production (-7/6,7/6). In order to check 
whether DSD holds we first determine equilibrium prices in an exchange economy 
with endowments ((1-9µ,9µ), (l-(l-9)µ,(1-9)µ), where µ , the measure of active 
firms producing (-1,1), is near the measure of active firms in ADM equilibrium, 
7/6. (This follows a standard procedure for determining the "inverse demand" 
function faced by an oligopolist; see, for example, Novshek and Sonnenschein 
[1978], and takes into account the profits A and B receive from the firms they 
own, and the subsequent influence on demand.) Consumer A's optimal net trade 
in this exchange economy is: 
tA(p,µ) (� l+p 
1-29µ) l+p 
[Figure 8 around here] 





The exchange economy equilibrium price p{µ) satisfies tA (p{µ),µ) + 
tB(p(µ),µ) = (O,O), so 
p{µ) - 3µ-9µ-3 - ll--9µ-3µ [ ll--( 3+9 ){7 /6) 12 
and EE. dµ I µ= 7/6 
3-79 
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For 9 < 3/7 DSD fails: output price increases as the measure of active firms 
increases (near the perfectly competitive measure, 7/6.)
8 
(See Figure 9 . )
The ADM equilibrium is not the limit of pure strategy Cournot equilibria from 
the sequence of economies {�a)}, a& (O,l] with non-infinitesimal firms 
which converge to the limit economy €. (0). In €Ca) each active firm uses a units 
of labor to produce a units of food. If the number of active firms is k 
and ka � 7/6, then entry will be profitable; alternatively, if ka < 7/6, 
then firms will be making negative profits and should exit. Thus the ADM 
equilibrium is � a perfectly competitive equilibrium of the sequence. However, 
if ownership shares are reallocated so that 9 > 3/7, then DSD holds (see 
Figure 9), and the ADM equilibrium is the limit of Cournot equilibria from the 
sequence of economies {Cca)}, a& (O,l]; that is, it is a perfectly competitive 
equilibrium of the sequence. For the original specification of ownership there 
exists no perfectly competitive equilibrium of the sequence. At each non-negative 
profit state the entry of a firm will lead to a positive profit. 
[Figure 9 around here] 
VI. THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM SYNTHESIS
A. Existence and Characterization of Equilibrium 
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Our basic general equilibrium model is , with the exception of production 
sets (and our sequence of economies approach) , the standard Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie 
model with standard assumptions. For expository purposes , we make no effort here 
to use the most general assumptions possible. There are t co11D110dities 
k = 1 ,2 ,  • • •  ,t and m consumers i = 1,2,  • • •  ,m. Each consumer i has (1) 
preferences �- defined over a consumption set :x.� , (2) an initial endowment1 1 
w. e: Rt , and (3) for each t , an ownership share , Q.t e:[O,l] of the firm t1 1 
To simplify notation we will assume that the ownership share is independent of 
the firm, (Qit = Qi for all t) and that the consumer sector is the same in the
limit economy e(o) and in every e(a) , a e: (O ,l]. The assumptions on the consumer
sector (X. , �-. w., Q.)� 1 are standard (see; e.g., Debreu [1959]):1 1 1 1 i= 
Al: (i) for each i=l , • • •  ,m , XiC:.R
t is nonempty , closed , convex ,
and bounded below, 
(ii) for each i�l , • • •  ,m , � i is a complete, convex preorder on Xi
which is ccntinuous, 
(iii) for each i=l , • • •  · , m ,  there is no satiation consumption in Xi ,
(iv) for each i=l , • • •  ,m,  wi e: interior Xi
(v) for each i=l, • • •  ,m , Qi e: [O ,l], andm 
(vi) i: Q. = l 
i=l 1 
To treat nonconvex technologies and free entry at the firm level our 
assumptions on the producer sector differ from the standard assumptions in two 
important ways. First , individual firm production sets are the union of the 
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origin and a compact strictly convex set which is bounded away from the origin. 
[Figure 10 around here] 
This assumption provides a simple production set analog of U-shaped average 
cost in partial equilibrium. The origin is included in the production set to guarantee 
free exit -- in the long run a firm can always avoid losses by shutting down completely. 
Second , each economy has an infinity of potential firms; a countable infinity of 
firms in each economy E.!a), and a continuum of firms in the limit economy !CO).
In the Cournot equilibria of e(a) only a finite number of firms will be active
so there will always be additional firms available to check the profitability 
of entry. 
To generate a model with aggregate constant returns to scale production 
in the limit economy, 
subsets of Rt with
let Y1 ,Y2 , • • •  ,Yn be nonempty, compact , strictly convex
Yj () R! = � for j=l ,2,  • • •  ,n and, for each j , let
C(Yj) be the smallest closed , convex cone with vertex 0 containing Yj
[Figure 11 around here] 
We generate a sequence of economies {(Ca)} ,  a e: (O ,l], converging to a 
limit economy €Co) with production sets C(Y1) ,  C(Y2) ,  • • •  ,C(Yn) for "industries"
1 ,2, • • •  ,n as follows: for each ae: (O,l] let the production sector of &a) 
consist of , for each j ,  a countable infinity of firms with identical production 
sets aY.U {O}; let the production sector of C(O) consist of, for each j ,  
J 
a continuum [O,m) of firms with production set Y. \) {O} • The aggregate 
m J 
production set in E(a) for "industry" j is l: (aY. U {0}).9 Similarly, the
t=l J 
aggregate production set in f;(O) for "industry" j is f(Y . U {O})dt = C(Y.).10 
0 J J 
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For every ae:(O,l], !: (aY.U{O})CC(Y.). For any M < "'  the set of actions 
t=l J J "' 
in C(Y.) with norm less than M , which are not in !: (aY.U{O}), becomes J t=l J 
arbitrarily small as a converges to.zero. Thus the "industry" production sets 
in €Ca) converge to the "industry" production sets in £(0). Since all 
economies have the same consumer sector, the economies £(a) converge to the 
limit economy e(o). 
The simplifying assumption that each consumer's ownership share is identical 
across firms, implies that each consumer's wealth depends only on prices p , 
and aggregate production y , and not on the arrangement of production among firms. 
Thus the excess demand D of the consumer sector (the sum of individual 
consumer's gross demands, minus the sum of resources owned as initial endowments 
by the consumer sector) is a function only of prices and aggregate production, 
D = D(p,y). An "inverse demand" selection F(y) is a function from aggregate 
outputs'y, to prices F(y), which clear markets given the action of firms: 
D(F(y),y) = y.11 
An equilibrium for t(a) is a Cournot equilibrium with profits evaluated 
using a selection F: 
Definition: Given an inverse demand selection F , n,m {yjt} j=l,t=l 
is a Cournot equilibrium for E:Ca) relative to F if 
(i) yjt e: aYj lJ {O} for all t=l,2,... for all j=l,2, • • •  ,n, and 
n n 
(ii) y.t • F( !: !: Yks) � y!t J k=l s=l J 
F( !: !: yks - Y·t + y!t) k=l s=l J J 
for all Yjt e: aYjlJ{O}, for all t=l,2, ••• 
for all j=l,2, • • •  ,n. 
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The first condition for equilibrium requires individual feasibility. The 
second condition requires that each firm be profit maximizing given the selection 
F and the actions of the other firms; i.e., the equilibrium is a Nash 
equilibrium in quantities (or a Cournot equilibrium). Let C(a,F) be the 
set of equilibrium "i:dustry" out�uts for ' ECa) relative to 
C(a,F) = { ( !: ylt••••• !: y t) {y.t}n,m is t=l t=l n J j=l,t=l 
equilibrium for ECa) relative to F} • 
F : 
a Cournot 
When the cones C(Y1), C(Y2), • • •  ,C(Yn) are positively semi-independent 
(see Debreu [1959] p. 22), and the consumer sector satisfies assumption Al, a 
standard argument shows that C(a,F) lies in some compact cube (otherwise some 
points would lead to allocations in which some consumers would be outside their 
consumption sets, and F would not be defined). By our assumptions on the 
Y., a countable infinity of active firms with production set aY . U {O} would J J 
require at least one input at an unbounded level. Therefore in an equilibrium 
for E.Ca) at most a finite number of firms can be active in any industry. 
A perfectly competitive equilibrium for the sequence {e(a)}is defined as 
a limit point of a robust sequence of Cournot equilibria for the economies �(a): 
Definition: (p*,y*) is a perfectly competitive equilibrium for the sequence 
£€C a)}ae: (0,1], if there exists 
(i) an inverse demand selection F which is continuously differentiable 
in a neighborhood of y* and satisfies F(y*) = p*; 
(ii) a strictly decreasing sequence {ar};=l C: (O,l] which converges 
to zero; and 
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(iii) for each Cl c U [ca2 ,ca2r-1] an equilibrium "industry" outputr=l \' 
vector for £(ca) relative to F , y(ca)c C(ca,F), such that y(ca) 
converges to y* as ca converges to zero (varying over lJ [ca2r,ca2r_1]r=l 
only). 
The same ."inverse demand" selection F , is used throughout the definition. 
The requirement that F be continuous in a neighborhood of y* rules out 
''boundary equilibria" (see K. Roberts [1980]) which we take to be an artifact 
of the requirement that inverse demand is correctly perceived, even at 
discontinuities. Under some conditions (as in the partial equilibrium model in 
section III), it is possible to find y(ca) c C(ca,F) for all small Cl such 
that y(ca) converges to y* • In other situations gaps repeatedly occur in 
the set of Cl values for which an equilibrium near y* exists for E.Cca). 
However, the definition demands a robust sequence of Cl values, with nondegenerate 
intervals of existence, not an ordinary sequence with a countable infinity of 
points of existence. Thus, the definition requires something much stronger than 
the coincidence that "demand at the competitive price is an integral multiple of 
the efficient output for firms." 
What are the properties of equilibria of the perfectly competitive sequence 
{€£ca)}? How are these equilibria related to the ADM (price taking) equilibria 
of the limit economy C(O)? The answers are analogous to the partial equilibrium 
results of Theorem 1: the equilibria of the perfectly competitive sequence 
are those ADM equilibria of the limit economy which satisfy an additional 
condition, DSD, which is related to downward sloping demand in the partial 
equilibrium case. 
Consider an equilibrium of the perfectly competitive sequence, (p*,y*) , 
and the corresponding "inverse demand" function, F. In €,(ca), a firm in 
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industry j has production set caY.U{O} , and the "inverse demand" function J 
is continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of y*. Though price taking 
behavior has not been assumed, when a converges to zero a firm's ability to 
affect price becomes arbitrarily small. Even the entry or exit of firms has a 
small effect on price. Thus each "industry" output in equilibrium, � , 
must maximize profit over the industry production set, C(Yj)' relative to prices
p*, and must satisfy p*•y* = O • (If p*"Y* > O (< O) inactive (active) firmsJ J 
could not have been profit maximizing in the Cournot equilibrium of £.(ca) for 
small ca • If p*·y. = O but p*·y > 0 for some y c C(Y.) then inactive firmsJ J 
could not have been profit maximizing in �(ca).) By an interchangeability 
lemma (see Koopmans [1957] p. 13) any decomposition of y* into feasible actions
for individual firms in f,(O) is such that all firms' actions must be profit
maximizing over their production sets relative to prices p* Thus the actions 
of firms are � if they are price takers in equilibrium, and an equilibrium
of the perfectly competitive sequence is an ADM equilibrium of the limit economy fCo). 
The example of Section V clearly demonstrates the difference between the 
� we obtain, "as if" price taking, and the assumption of price taking
behavior. The equilibria of the perfectly competitive sequence must satisfy an 
additional condition, (weak) DSD. As discussed in Section IV, the DSD condition 
is necessary for the process of entry to be at rest. As ca converges to zero, 
in the sequence of economies {£(ca)}, firms become arbitrarily small relative to 
the market, and thus have arbitrarily small impact on prices. Therefore, any 
y. cY. with p*·y. < O would not (for ca sufficiently small) be able to changeJ J J 
price enough to make a nonnegative profit when introduced as cayj c caYj.
Since max p*•Yj = max p*·C(Yj)
p*•y. > O are available. TheJ 
= O, no actions cayj in caYj




the profit differential (above the profit made by an active firm) available to 
an inactive firm by switching to ay. E aY. with P*·y. = 0 in the €Ca)J J J 
equilibrium. When weak DSD fail_s the profit differential is positive, and 
inactive firms could not be profit maximizing for a sufficiently small. Thus 
the process of entry could not be at rest in €:Ca) , and <Yt•····Y�) could 
not be a limit point of !!.!!r sequence of equilibria of E.Ca) relative to F • 
These ideas are used to prove the following result: 
Theorem 2 : Let (X .• � •• w., 9.)� 1 be a consumer sector satisfying assumption l. l. l. l. i= 
Al and let Y1,Y2, • • •  ,Yn be nonempty, compact, strictly convex subsets of 
Rt with Yj ()R! =II and C(Y1), C(Y2), • • •  ,C(Yn) positively semi-independent. 
Let {£(a)4 a E (O,l] and (CO) be the sequence of economies generated by 
(X.,�., w., 9.)� l and Y1, Y2, • • •  ,Y . Let (p*,y1•,y2*, • • •  ,�) be a perfectly i i i i i= n n 
competitive equilibrium of the sequence {E(a)} , and let F be the corresponding 
"inverse demand" selection. Then (1 ) for each j, p*•y:t = max p* • C(Y.) = 0 • and J J 
(2) for each j, for each y. E Y. with p*•y. = O , 
n J J J oF y! [a ( i: y.*)]r. � o (weak DSD). J y j=l J J 
The first re>ult implies that an equilibrium of €_(0) is a price taking 
equilibrium. By an interchangeability lemma (see Koopmans [1957]) any decomposition 
of y* into feasible actions for individual firms is such that all firms must be 
profit maximizing given the fixed vector of prices p* • 
The second result is that at equilibrium (weak) DSD must hold. 
Theorem 2 shows that the equilibria of the perfectly competitive sequence are 
ADM equilibria of €.(O) and satisfy (weak) DSD. To complete the analogy to the 
partial equilibrium results of Theorem 1, we next state a theorem which shows 
that the ADM equilibria of E:Co) which satisfy (strong) DSD are equilibria of the 
perfectly competitive sequence {�(a)}. 
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Theorem 3: Let (X.,� •• w.,9.)� l be a consumer sector satisfying assumption l. l. l. l. i= 
Al and let Yl'Y2, • • •  ,Yn be nonempty, compact, strictly convex 
subsets of Rt with Y. () Rt= II 
J + 
positively semi-independent. Let 
and C(Y1),C(Y2> ••••• c(Yn ) 
{E(a», a E (0,1], and 
€.Co) be the sequence of economies generated by (Xi.�i•'i ,9i)�=l' 
and Y1 ,Y2, .. . ,Yn. Given (p*,yt•�•· • • • �) and an "inverse demand" 
selection F, if 
n 






in a neighborhood of i: Y! , 
j=l J 
for each j = 1,2, • • •  ,n, y* E C(Y.) • 
J J 
for each j=l,2, • • •  ,n, p*·YJ =max p*·C(Yj)• 
for each j=l,2, • • •  ,n, for all yj E Yj with p*• yj = 
3F n Yj [a- ( 0l: y�)]yj < 0 (strong DSD), and y J=l 
(5) a regularity condition holds,12 
0 • 
then (p*,yt •• • •  ,�) is an equilibrium of the perfectly competitive 
sequence { £ {a)}. 
Condition (1) of the theorem requires that markets clear at prices p* 
n 
when firms produce i: Y! in aggregate, and that F selects these prices and 
j=l J 
is well behaved locally. The second condition requires that each "industry" 
production be feasible. The third condition requires that each "industry" 
* 
production be profit maximizing at prices p • Conditions (l)-(3) imply that 
* * * 
(p , y1 1 • • •  , y0) is an ADM (price-taking) equilibri1111. The fourth condition 
* * * 
requires that (strong) DSD holds at (p , y1 , •••• yn ") for the selection F: 
the prices detemined by F give proper entry s_ignals so that the process of 
* * * entry could b.e at rest at (p , y1 , • • •  , y0 ) • Along with the regularity condi-
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* * * tion (S) , Theorem 3 •tate• tbat theae condition• imply that (p , y1 , • • •  , yn ) 
1a the lill1t of a robuat •equence of Cournot equilibria of E:, (a) relative to 
Hction 1. nw. an Alll •quilibriua of C (Q) which. eatiafiea 
(strong) DSD b an equilibrium of the perfectly competitive sequence {€(a)}.  
The proof of this result b fairly long and technical. See Hovshek: and
Sonnenschein [1978]. 
Theorem 2 shoved that (weak:) DSD was a necessary condition for an equilibrium 
of the perfectly competitive sequence. Theorem 3 shows that (strong) DSD 
(along with the standard conditions for an ADM equilibrium and a regularity 
condition) is a sufficient condition for an equilibrium of the perfectly competitive 
sequence. As the example in Section V demonstrates, there are perfectly 
competitive sequences of economies with no equilibrium, but for which the ADM 
equilibrium conditions (and the regularity condition) hold at some point. Thus 
the (strong) DSD condition i• required as part of the set of sufficient conditions.
While Theot'elll 3 gives conditions under which a partic:ular point will be an 
equilibrium of the perfectly competitive sequence, it does not specify conditions 
on ths perfectly competitive sequence or the limit economy £;Co) to guarantee 
that the sequence has � equilibrium. The following corollary does provide 
sufficient conditions on the limit econcmy £ Co) to guarantee existence of an 
equilibrium for the perfectly competitive sequence. 
Corollary 1 : Let (Xi"a:i,wi,ei)�=l be a consumer sector satisfying assumption 
Al and let Y1,Y2, • • • • Yn be nonempty. compact. strictly convex subsets of 
R1 with Yj /l R! • f and CCY1) ,CCY2) ,  • • •  ,C(Yn) positively semi-independe�t.
Let { £Ca)},  a c(00l] and cCo) be the sequence of economies generated by 
(Xi,a:i ,wi.ei)�=l and Y1.Y2 • • • •  ,Yn. If the consumer sector of f.Co) acts as 
a single consumer with differentiably convex preferences13 (and the regularity 
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condition holds everywhere) ,  then the perfectly competitive sequence lE:ca)} 
has an equilibrium and it is unique. 
The corollary follows £rom Theorem 3 and three observations : (a) The 
assumptions of Corollary l are sufficient to guarantee the existence of a unique 
point (p*,y*) satisfying conditions (1) ..; (3) of Theorma 3 (the ADM equilibrium 
conditions) .  (b) A single conswner with differentiably convex preferences 
generates a unique selection F. When aggregate production is y and the 
consumer' s  initial endowment is w , the consumer must demand y + w at 
prices F(y) and wealth F(y) • (y+w). Thus F(y) is the unique (after normalization) 
supporting price for the bundle y+w. (c) F satisfies (strong) DSD at y*. If 
prices are normalized so that the first c0111DOdity is the numeraire, then, using 
Walras' law, the properties of F can be determined by examining the properties 
of the excess demand for the last 1-1 c01111110dities. Computation of 
aF n y' ["'f"" ( I yt)]y for .any nonzero y with p*•y = 0 shows that (strong) DSD y j=l J 
follows from the negative definiteness of the consumer's (1-l)x(l-l) substitution 
matrix (the substitution matrix with first row and column deleted) .
Conditions under which the consumer sector of an economy acts as a single 
consumer are well lcnown (e.g. , see Shafer and Sonnenscbein [1982] ) .  
B .  The Classical Theorems of Welfare Economics 
We now turn to the two classical theorems of welfare economics in the 
context of free entry and firms which are arbitrarily small relative to the 
economy� First we must define a Pareto optimal allocation for the sequence 
£E: Ca)} .  For any a c(O ,l] a vector (x*1 , • • •  ,x*, y1•,  • • •  ,y*) is a feasible . m n 
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allocation in �(a) if xt is in the consumption set for consumer i for 
i=l,2, • • •  ,m, Y! is in the production set for "industry" j 
., m n 
( i: (aY.U{o})) for j=l,2, • • •  _,n, and resources balance, i: x* - i: y* = w 
t=l J i=l i j=l J 
where w is the aggregate endowment of the economy. A feasible allocation in 
E: (a) is Pareto optimal in f;(a) if there does not exist a second feasible 
allocation at which all consumers are at least as well off as at the first 
allocation and at least one consumer is strictly better off. We define the 
Pareto optimal allocations of the perfectly competitive sequence { € Ca)} to 
be the limit points of Pareto optimal allocations for the �(a) • That is, 
t is a Pareto optimal allocation for the sequence if there exists sequences 
{'\:} and {tk} such that '\: converges to zero, tk converges to t, and tk 
is a Pareto optimal allocation of �('\:) for each k • 
Because of the way in which the sequence { E.<a)} converges to the limit 
economy �(O), it is easy to see that every Pareto optimal allocation for the 
sequence is also a Pareto optimal allocation for Ee O). Also, every Pareto 
optimal allocation of 80) is the limit of Pareto optimal allocations for the 
e(a) . and thusi_s aPareto optimal allocation for the perfectly competitive 
sequence { €.Ca)} • 14 
Under what conditions are equilibria of the sequence Pareto optimal 
allocations? Under what conditions can Pareto optimal allocations be supported 
as equilibria of the sequence? An answer to the first question was produced by 
Oliver Hart [1979]. He showed that for a differentiated products general 
equilibrium model, limit points of the Cournot equilibria of prelimit economies 
must be Pareto optimal allocations. In our model the equilibria of the perfectly 
competitive sequence satisfy all the conditions of an ADM equilibrium. As long 
as the conditions of the ADM First Welfare Theorem are satisfied, equilibria 
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of the sequence are ADM equilibria of the limit economy, which are Pareto optimal. 
Thus, with weaker assumptions than At (for example, see Debreu [1959] p. 94) , 
we get: 
Theorem 4 :  Equilibria o f  the perfectly competitive sequence { E:(a)} are 
Pareto optimal. 
The Second Welfare Theorem takes on an additional subtlety in our context. 
By the ADM Second Welfare Theorem, under suitable assumptions, every Pareto 
optimal allocation can be supported as an ADM equilibrium. However, not every 
ADM equilibrium of the limit economy €(0) is an equilibrium of the perfectly 
competitive sequence €Ca) • We must be able to redistribute initial endowments 
and ownership shares (as was possible in the example of Section III by setting 
9 > �) so that prices give correct entry signals (DSD holds). Otherwise, 
the process of entry might never be at rest near the Pareto optimal allocation, 
and therefore that allocation would not be a limit point of a robust sequence 
of Cournot equilibria of �(a) (that is, an equilibrium of the perfectly 
competitive sequence {€(a)}). We next show that the ADM assumptions for their 
Second Welfare Theorem, plus assumptions on consumers ' preferences which guarantee 
that each consumer has a twice continuously differentiable demand :function 
(because we work in a differentiable framework) with a negative definite 
substitution effects matrix,15 are enough to allow us to redistribute ownership 
shares and endowments so that (strong) DSD holds. Then, with the addition of 
the regularity condition, the Pareto optimal allocation for the sequence can be 
supported· as an equilibrium of the sequence; i.e., as a limit point of a robust 
I 
sequence of Cournot equilibria of E:Ca) , with suitable redistribution of 
initial endowments and ownership shares. 
Our initial specification of the consumer sector does not specify 
individual initial endowments w . nor ownership shares 9 .  • It only i m i 
specifies the aggregate endowment w = r w. , since that is all that is
i=l l. 
33 . 
relevant for the Pareto optimal allocation. The theorem establishes that , under 
suitable conditions , it is always possible to redistribute initial endowments 
and ownership shares so that for the new sequence of private ownership economies , 
€: Ca) , the Pareto optimal allocation for the sequence is the limit point of a 
robust sequence of Cournot equilibria of E:Ca) ; i.e. , an equilibrium allocation 
for the perfectly competitive sequence {�a)}. 
Theorem 5 :  Let ((Xi ,�i)�=l ' w) be a consumer sector satisfying
(i) for i=l ,2,  ••• ,m , Xi is convex, and 
(ii) for i=l ,2 ,  • ••  ,m,  �i have no satiation point and generate a
twice continuously differentiable demand function with a 
negative definite substitution-terms matrix.15
Let Y1 ,Y2 , ••• ,Yn be nonempty , compact , strictly convex subsets
of Rt with Yj n R! = !a , C(Y1) ,  C(Y2) ,  ••• ,C(Yn) positivelyn 
semi -independent and (-R!> C:: r C(Y.).16 Let {�(a)} ,  a E (O ,l]
j=l ] 
and €(0) be the sequence of economies generated by c cxi .�i ,�=l 'w)
and Y1 ,Y2 , ••• ,Yn Let Cxy , • • •  ,x� ,yy , ••• ,y�) be a Pareto
optimal allocation for the ·sequence such that 
(iii) for i=l ,2,  • • •  ,m,  xt E interior Xi •
Then if the regularity condition holds , there exists a vector of 
prices , p*, initial endowments "t• i=l ,2,  • • •  , m with 
m 
E wt = w ,  and nonnegative ownership shares 9*, i=l ,2 ,  • ••  ,m
i=l l. l. 
m 
(with r 9* = 1) such that (p*,y*) is an equilibrium for the
i=l l. 
sequence { E(a)} (when endowments are wt• i=l , ••• ,m and 
ownership shares are et, i=l , ••• ,m) , and for each 
i=l,2 ,  ••• ,m,  xt is the corresponding demand for consumer i 
n 
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(that is , xt maximizes �i on {xEX. I 
p*·x � p*•w. + 9. r p*·�}).
l. l. l.j=l ] 
The Pareto optimal allocation for the sequence is also a Pareto optimal 
allocation for the limit economy €:Co) , so by the standard Second Welfare 
Theorem there are prices , p*, and an assigmnent of endowments and ownership 
shares such that the Pareto optimal allocation is supported as an ADM equilibrium 
of €Co). It remains to show that the assignment can be made so that (strong) 
n
DSD holds. If we assign endowments and ownership shares so that w. + e .  r y* = x*
l. l.j=l ] l. 
for each i • then (strong) DSD holds. (The argument is similar to the argument 
that a single consumer generates an "inverse demand" satisfying (strong) DSD 
used for Corollary 1. In this case a sum of m negative definite matrices 
appears instead of the single negative definite matrix in the single consumer 
case. ) Application of Theorem 3 completes the proof of Theorem 5. 
Theorem 5 shows that , under suitable conditions , every Pareto optimal 
allocation for the sequence { f (a) } can be supported as an equilibrium of the 
sequence. Endowments and ownership shares are redistributed not only to make 
incomes "right" but also to make prices give correct entry signals (DSD must 
hold). 
It is important to observe that Theorem 5 is not as positive as the 
corresponding ADM result (see ; e.g. , Debreu [1959] , p. 95). In that theory 
all of the required redistribution can be achieved by means of a single 
35. 
commodity , which may be thought of as "government transfer. " Here this may 
not be possible. Leo Hurwicz [1959] refers to the property that every optimum 
is an equilibrium (after redistribution) as "unbiasedness." Our analysis 
suggests a bias of the competitive mechanism that goes beyond what can be 
corrected by "government transfer." This bias can be corrected , but the 
correction in general requires more than the redistribution of a single 
cononodity. From the viewpoint presented here , the competitive mechanism has 
the bias that it can only seek out those optima that, with the means of transfer 
at hand, give the necessary entry signals. 
VII. DYNAMICS 
Marshall and Walras looked past the tatonnement to a long-run equilibrium 
in vh'eh all factors are free to vary, and they "flow towards that branch of
production" in which there are profits to be realized. In the short run certain 
factors are inunobile ,  and the returns to these factors are not necessarily 
equalized. Prices clear markets at each moment, but these prices reflect only 
the relative scarcity of factors that are instantaneously variable. Walras 
described the process by which these quickly adjusting prices are reached by a 
tatonnement. 
In each e(ci) firms correctly perceive the prices , F(y) , that will prevail
given any aggregate production y. Thus our analysis has always included an 
implicit perceived adjustment of prices to clear markets, a tatonnement for the 
exchange economy generated by any fixed production vector 
17 
y • For our model
of dynamics we assume that the adjustment of prices to clear markets is instantaneous 
relative to the speed at which firms are able to change production levels. 
36. 
Following the standard Harshallian framework, the next consideration is the 
quantity adjustments made by a fixed number of active firms to get to a short 
run equilibrium. In £(ci) we assume a continuous Cournot dynamics; that is ,
each active firm changes its output continuously , recognizing its own effect 
on price but myopically assuming all other firms' outputs are fixed. In the 
limit economy €Co) , each firm is infinitesimal and this dynamics is equivalent 
to that generated by firms' continuous adjustment viewing price as fixed. In 
both £(0) and E.(ci) / the firms are myopic since all firms are adjusting and
and price is changing over time. Exit is not allowed in the short run, so a 
firm in "industry" j must produce an output from ciYj If F is
continuously differentiable and ci is small, then the firm has little effect
on price. Thus the incentives and behavior of the firm in the short run dynamic 
for ECci) "converge to" that in the short run dynamic for E,(o) .
The bridge between the short run and the long run is built in the following 
manner. For concreteness, let us refer to the factor that is fixed in the 
short run as entrepreneurship. After each tatonnement we assume that entre­
preneurship flows in the direction of increasing profi t ;  that is , the number 
of active firms changes based on the profit in 
each industry. Following such a period of factor movement , a new short run 
equilibrium is determined with associated prices, and these new prices lead to 
new incentives for factors to move, and so on. From this point of view the 
tatonnement takes place with great speed relative to the short run quantity 
adjustment of firms, which takes place with great speed relative to the entry 
and exit adjustment of the entrepreneurial factor. As in the short run 
adjustment , in €Cci) firms enter or leave recognizing their own effect on
price, but viewing other firms' actions as fixed , so again, in E'.J:o) this 
entry dynamic is equivalent to that generated by viewing price as fixed. In 
37. 
both the short and long run, firms ' behavior is myopic. The entry-exit decision 
is a choice of production set aYj or {O} If F is continuously differentiable 
and a is small, then the firm ' s  decision has little effect on price . Thus 
the incentives and behavior of the firm in the long run dynamic for €.Ca) 
"converge to" that in the long run dynamic for fCo). 
The DSD condition suggests a dynamic theory of the movement towards the 
long-run equilibrium, in which the realignment of the entrepreneurial factor 
plays a significant role. Since DSD is a necessary condition for equilibrium of 
the perfectly competitive sequence {f!a)} , no infinitesimal firm in �(0) can 
enter with positive profit at an equilibrium. But out of a long-run equilibrium 
we can conceive of entry and exit that is proportional to the returns to the 
entrepreneurial factor. This leads to consideration of the stability of the 
equilibrilll!I introduced in the previous sections. It is related to the question 
of whether returns to the homogeneous entrepreneurial factors have a tendency 
to be equalized and whether myopic profit seeking behavior moves an economy 
toward a Pareto optimum. In addition, it is relevant to the viability of a 
planning procedure in which production units are centrally added in those 
sectors which are the most profitable. 
For simplicity we will discuss the dynamics in terms of the limit economy 
(Co). We have already argued that when a is small, both the short and long 
run dynamics in €.Ca) will be similar to the dynamics in E:Co). Our three stages 
of dynamics are : 
(1) instantaneous adjustment of prices to clear markets given any 
aggregate production y ; 
38. 
(2) output adjustment by a fixed number (mass) of firms, each viewing 
price as fixed at each instant, to reach a short run equilibrilll!I; 
and 
( 3) entry and exit at a rate proportional to the ( firm) profit levels 
in each industry to reach a long run equilibrium. 
A. Partial Equilibrium and Simple General Equilibrium Dynamics 
The dynamics we have in mind are conveniently illustrated by means of the 
partial equilibrium market M(O) that was used in Section III. We add to the 
hypotheses from that section the condition that F is non-increasing and there 
exists a unique y* such that F(y*)  = C(l). In this case there is a unique 
equilibrium. 
The dynamics are introduced as follows. For each aggregate output y , 
market clearing prices are given by F(y), and the usual tatonnement adjustment 
is stable since F is nonincreasing. In the short run an active firm is forced 
to produce a positive quantity whether or not the positive, profit maximizing 
action leads to positive profit. Thus each active firm increases output whenever 
the current price exceeds the marginal cost at the current output level, and 
decreases output when current marginal cost exceeds price. This adjustment 
is stable since F is nonincreasing and all firms have nondecreasing marginal 
cost. For each mass of active firms µ, the short run equilibrium price associated 
with µ ,  p{µ)  , is determined as follows : 
1. Supply, S(p{µ) ), is the integral of the profit maximizing actions of 
the µ active firms at price p{µ), and 
2 .  F(S( p(µ ) )  = p{µ) ; that is , the inverse demand o f  supply a t  p { µ )  is 
p(µ)  ( or short run supply equals demand at p(µ ) ). 
39.  
Let w(µ) denote the profit of each active firm when there are µ active 
firms in short run equilibrium . Then it is clear that the long run equilibrium 





one starts with a certain mass of licensed facilities. 3 If 9 > 7 , then the 
procedure which has facilities added when profits are positive, and facilities 
closed when there are losses, converges to the unique Pareto optimal allocation. 
B. General Equilibrium Dynamics 
A word of interpretation is in order. Suppose that we start with the initial Our general equilibrium existence theorem applies to a sequence of economies 
mass of active firms µ(O) . The prices p(µ(O)) are short run equilibrium 
prices and provide signals for entry. Over time the mass of active firms 
continuously changes and there is a continuum of short run equilibria during 
this adjustment. When the mass of active firms is µ(t), the short run 
equilibrium prices are p(µ(t)). The mass of active firms adjusts towards the 
final equilibrium at which profits are zero and each firm produces at efficient 
scale . 
Before beginning the general equilibrium analysis, it is useful to explore 
what these ideas mean for the general equilibrium example considered in Section V .  
For 9 > � there i s  a unique equilibrium for { f' (a)} • It i s  the unique ADM 
equilibrium of ECO) and DSD is satisfied. For any initial mass of active 
firms that leaves consumers in their consumption sets when each active firm 
produces at the efficient point (-1 ,1) , the dynamics defined by :� = w(µ) 
converge to the unique equilibrium µ* = � . On the other hand, if 9 < � 
then the unique ADM equilibrium remains µ* = � , but this allocation is not 
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even locally stable. 
The example at hand is useful for presenting a planning interpretation . 
Suppose that the central authority provides licenses for opening or closing 
facilities, but aside from this allows prices to be flexible . In the example 
{ €: (a)} in which the demand sector acts as a single consumer (Corollary 1). 
We now apply our entry dynamics to this case to test whether the existence and 
stability theories can be tied together as they are in Marshall's theory. Is the 
entry dynamics stable or does it lead to a form of market failure in which the 
economy fails to approach the unique equilibrium? It is clear that the dynamics 
can only be discussed at aggregate productions y , which lead to feasible 
allocations for consumers (otherwise F(y) is not defined) . For the single 
consumer case this means we can only discuss dynamics at aggregate outputs y , 
which, when added to the consumer's initial endowment w , are feasible consumptions 
for the consumer; that is y + w £ X • (To avoid further problems with the 
boundary of the consumption set, X, we assume that the boundary of X forms a 
single indifference curve for the consumer or consumer sector. )  I s  i t  the case 
that, starting from any such aggregate production, the entry dynamics leads to 
the redistribution of entrepreneurial activity, entry, and exit which converges 
to the unique equilibrium of {€.(a)} 
.
guaranteed by Corollary l? Theorem 6 
shows the answer is yes , the unique equilibrium of {E(a)} is "globally" 
stable under the entry dynamics. When the consumer sector acts as a single 
consumer, prices give the proper entry signals so that the entry dynamics leads 
to a Pareto optimal allocation. 
ql. 
The general equilibrium dynamics are perfectly analogous to the partial 
equilibrium dynamics. For any aggregate y , market clearing prices are given 
by F(y). In the short run the fixed mass of active firms adjust their productions 
myopically till a short run equilibrium is attained. The resulting short run 
equilibrium prices provide the incentives for long run entry and exit decisions 
by entrepreneurs. The rate of entry in any "industry" is proportional to 
(firm) profit levels in that industry at that time. 
We begin by defining a short run, perfectly competitive equilibrium 
(without free entry or exit) for the economy with a single consumer (X,2 ,w,l) 
and measure nj of active infinitesimal firms with production set Yj
"industry" j • We assume Y1 , ••• ,Yn are nonempty, compact, strictly convex
subsets of R1 with Y. 0 R.t = !1 and C(Y1) ,  C(Y2), • •• ,C(Y ) positively] T n 
in 
semi-independent, and (X,2,w ,l) satisfies assumption Al with differentiably
convex preferences as in Corollary 1 .  
Definition: (p, y1 , ••• ,yn ) is a short run competitive equilibrium with measures 
of active firms (n1, • . .  ,nn) if 
(1) for each j, Yj £ njYj ,
(2) for each j ,  yj maximizes p
•y on njYj , and 
n n 
( 3 )  w T E y .  £ X maximizes 2 on {x£X
I
p·x  .::_ p·(w T E y.)}
j=l ] j=l ] 
The first condition requires that the aggregate action yj be feasible for
"industry" j when mass n .  of firms are active. 
] 
The second condition requires 
that all active firms be profit maximizing given prices p and subject to 
the constraint of remaining active. Since firms cannot shut down (O t yj)
42 . 
they may be making losses . The third condition requires that the consumer 
sector demand at prices p 
n 
available supply, w + r yj j=l 
Before discussing the 
n 
and income p • (w + r yj ) exactly match the j=l 
stability of the long run entry adjustment process , 
it is natural to examine the stability of both the tatonnement and the short run 
adjustment proces s .  It is well known that for any fixed aggregate production y ,  
the tatonnement for this single consumer economy i s  stab le ,  converging t o  F(y) . 
Whenever a short run equilibrium exists, the price and aggregate output , summed 
n 
over "industries " ,  r_ y _  , must b e  a Pareto optimal allocation for the short 
j=l J 
run economy with the single consumer and convex production sets n1Y1 , • . . ,nnYn 
Strict convexity of preferences leads to a uniq_ue Pareto optimal allocation and 
unique supporting prices. The stability- of the short run adjustment process 
wi_th a fixed mass of firms follows. from the observation that when firms adjust 
their outputs to increase profit at the current prices , they move _aggregate 
output in a direction that increases the consumer 's utility (since the current 
prices are supporting prices for the consU1Der ' s  choice of the current bundle) . 
Thus the short run adj ustment process moves to the Pareto optimal allocation 
for the short run economy with a fixed mass of active firms , and this limit is 
the short run competitive equilibrium. 
The long run entry dynamics operates as follows : for the vector of masses 
of active firms at time t ,  Cn1 (t) , • • •  , � (t) ) ,  let (p (t) , y1(t) , • • •  , -yn(t) ) be
the unique , stable, short run equilihriuu. We assume firms enter (leave) industry 
j in proportion to the current profits ( losses) of individual firms in industry j :




Theorem 6: Let 
m (Xi '� 'wi , ei) i=l be a consumer sector satisfying 
assumption Al and let Y1 ,Y2 , . . •  ,Yn be nonempty, compact ,  strictly 
i i convex subsets of R with Yj f"l R+ = � and 
positively semi-independent .  Let { �(a) } ,  
be the sequence of economies generated by 
C(Y1) ,  C(Y2) , . . •  ,C(Yn) 
a e(O ,l] and t:<o>
m (Xi ,� 'wi , ei) i=l and 
Y1 ,Y2 , • • •  ,Yn . If the consumer sector of £.co) acts as a single 20 consumer with differentiably convex preferences , whose consumption 
set boundary is a single indifference curve (and the regularity 
condition holds everywhere) , then the unique equilibrium of �(a) 
21 
is "globally" stable for the entry dynamic. 
The proof of the stability of the long run entry dynamics follows from 
the observation that entry (or exit) takes place if and only if the change 
in the JDSSS of active firms leads to new short run "industry" production sets, 
n 
n1Y1 , . . .  ,n Y , such that t njY .  contains points in the upper contour setn n j=l J 
for the consurrer. (This does not depend on the relative speeds of adjus tment 
in the different "industries . ") Thus the new short run equilibrium leads to a 
higher utility level for the consumer, and the entry/exit adj ustment continues 
until the consumer reaches the Pareto optimal allocation for E, (0) , which is 
the unique equilibrium of { � (a) } .  
For economies with multiple industries and multiple consumers who do not 
act as a single consumer, the DSD conditions are necessary but , by themselves 
not sufficient for stability of equilibrium under the entry dynamic ,  not even 
for local stability . With multiple consumers , additional conditions on the 
interactions among "industries" must be satisfied for (local) stability. The 
DSD conditions are then something like the Hicksian stability conditions , which 
check only one JDSrket at a time . We also note that with multiple "industries , "  
44. 
entry in "industry" 1 may lead to increased profit in "industry" 2 ,  etc. Thus 
the dynamic path may have a decrease in the measure of firms in industry 2 
followed by an increase in the measure of active firms , and so on. This 
emphasizes the myopia of firm decision making. Even with this myopia ,  
convergence i s  guaranteed when the demand sector acts a s  i f  it were a single 
consumer. 
Let us summarize the dynamics . Before this section we were concerned 
with static analysis . Time was integrated into the analysis in the spirit of 
Debreu ' s  Theory of Value , with all commodities dated and all markets opening 
only once for the purpose of deciding on 'Who was to deliver what to whom and on 
what date . "  In this section the analysis is dynamic and temporary equilibrium 
in spirit . Markets open for today ' s  exchange. The prices determined in those 
markets determine profits ,  which are the basis for factor movements and a 
different distribution of firms tomorrow . Because of the new distribution of 
factors that are immobile in the short run , tomorrow ' s  prices are different 
from today ' s  and so are profits ,  etc. In our temporary equilibrium analysis we 
assume that firms are myopic; they do not consider how prices will change over 
time . Even with such myopia , for the leading case in which prices provide the 
correct entry signals and so equilibrium exists , namely the case in which the 
demand sector behaves as a single agent , equilibrium is globally stable. 
This of course provides a strong link between the existence and stability theorem , 
and we take this link to be very much in the spirit of both Walrasian and 
Marshallian analysis .  
VII I .  DECREASING RETURNS T O  SCALE I N  T HE  AGGREGATE 22 
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Our analysis has been carried out for the case of constant returns to 
scale in the aggregate. We now consider the case of decreasing returns to scale 
in the aggregate , caused by variation in the "quality" of some resource ,  such 
as land, as more and more land is used. The standard analysis for the partial 
equilibrium case is quite familiar. The ''high quality" land is more productive 
(or has lower average cost of production) so that , in equilibrium, a rent is 
paid for the high quality land. The marginal land , the "lowest quality" land 
being used in equilibrium, is paid no rent . The aggregate supply curve is upward 
sloping, since land of lower and lower quality must be brought into use and high 
quality land must be used more intensively (see Figure 12 ) .  What happens when 
these variations in efficiency are introduced in our framework? For concreteness 
let us assume that different firms have different efficiencies of production 
[Figure 12 around here] 
(minimum average costs in partial equilibrium) .  The first issue is merely a 
technical one : it becomes more complicated notationally to set up the perfectly 
competitive sequence £ £ C a ) }  an d  to define a notion o f  convergence to the 
limit economy E;C o ) .
The second issue i s  the definition o f  DSD. The idea remains the same , but 
the form of the condition must change since the additional firms that might 
consider entry are less efficient than the firms already active in equilibrium. 
The DSD condition requires that these less efficient firms could not profit from 
entry ; it does not require that additional firms just as efficient as the marginal 
firm could not profit from entry. A perfectly competitive equilibrium of the 
46. 
perfectly competitive sequence { € ( a ) }  is defined as a limit point of a robust 
sequence of Cournot equilibria with entry of (Ca )  • 
In this decreasing returns to scale in the aggregate framework , with the 
revised definition of DSD , the results of our previous analysis are unchanged : 
(weak ) DSD is a necessary condition for a price-allocation pair to be a perfectly 
competitive equilibrium of { E:Ca ) } ;  (strong) DSD , the ADM equilibrium conditions 
(and a regularity condition) are sufficient conditions for a price-allocation 
pair to be a perfectly competitive equilibrium of {€,(a) } (see Novshek and 
Sonnenschein [1983]) 1 if the consumer sector of E.C o )  acts as a single 
consumer , then { eC a ) }  has a unique equilibrium and it is "globally" stable 
for all entry dynamics ; 23 perfectly competitive equilibria are Pareto optimal ; 
and every Pareto optimal allocation of !fCa) } can , after a suitable redistribution 
of initial endowments and ownership shares , be supported as an equilibrium of 
{ f; Ca ) } .
As a final comment we note the effect o f  allowing mixed strategy equilibria 
in E:Ca ) .  For the constant-returns-to-scale-in-the-aggregate case ,  there 
exists an equilibrium of £< ci) for all sufficiently small a if and only if
there exists a robust sequence of pure strategy equilibria. Thus mixed strategies 
in ECa) only serve to "fill out" the sequence of equilibria , when it already 
exists for pure strategies . For the decreasing-returns-to-scale-in-the-aggregate 
case , the results are quite different . Mas-Colell [1983] has shown that (mixed 
strategy) equilibrium exists in eCaJ for all small a , regardless of the 
satisfaction of the DSD condition . With mixed strategies it is always possible 
to have a sufficiently large number of marginal firms using mixed strategies 
(which include action 0 with positive probability) so that the most efficient 
inactive firm is too inefficient to enter profitably. 
47. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Taken together the preceding results demonstrate that there is less tension 
than one might have thought between the rather institutional Marshallian model , 
with free entry and U-shaped average costs , and the formal ADM theory with its 
insistence on a general existence theorem and price-taking as a primitive. Recent 
advances in the theory of imperfect competition and mathematical economics make it 
possible to build a synthesis between the Marshallian and ADM models that 
incorporates the important aspect• ofboth, and provides a rigorous foundation 
for the theory of perfect competition . Let us review the accomplishment . 
We have presented a formal model of perfect competition with free entry , 
and U-shaped average costs . Price-taking is not a hypothesis of the theory , yet 
the actions of firms in perfectly competitive equilibrium are as if they cannot 
affect price. This is because perfect competition is defined by means of a 
sequence of economies { €Ca)} in which firms become arbitrarily small relative 
to the market. 
Consistent with the demands of the formalist school of economic theory , we 
have presented general conditions (Corollary 1) which guarantee that a perfectly 
competitive sequence { e:ca)} has at least one equilibrium. These conditions 
require that the consumer sector of the economy generates demand of the class 
that is generated by a single consumer. With this hypothesis , the entry (exit) 
of firms will reduce ( increase )  profit , and this condition is necessary for 
the existence of Cournot equilibrium with free entry in the economies f:Ca) 
The perfectly competitive equilibrium of the perfectly competitive sequence 
{ E. ( a ) }  is defined as the limit of these Cournot equilibria. 
48 . 
Theorems 2 and 3 identify the perfectly competitive equilibria of the 
sequence {e(a)} with the set of ADM equilibria of the limit economy E( O )  which 
satisfy DSD (weak DSD ) .  These theorems (and the example of Section V) tell us 
that the notion of perfectly competitive equilibrium presented here is more 
demanding than the .notion of ADM equilibrium , and indicate precisely which ADM 
equilibria are in our sense perfectly competitive . 
Theorems 4 and 5 concern the classical theorel!B of welfare economics in the 
context of U-shaped average costs and free entry. Perfectly competitive 
equilibria are optima ; however , the theorem that optima are perfectly competitive 
equilibria requires more than the usual caveat "relative to some redistribution 
of purchasing power. "  I n  our analysi s ,  it i s  generally required that several 
commodities be redistributed so that prices will provide the appropriate entry 
signals .  I n  contrast with the standard analysis , the welfare theorems presented 
here do not assume that agents are price-takers , and they do not apply for the 
case in which "one buyer faces one seller . "  The hypotheses of the theorems 
allow firms to recognize their market power ; however, they also require that 
firms be arbitrarily small relative to the market . 
Section VII is devoted to a dynamic theory of entry with Marshallian 
features .  The theory complements the usual tatonnement dynamics. Prices adjust 
quickly ( instantaneously) ; however , the quantity adjustment of firms and the 
entry and exit of firms take place more slowly. Firms are myopic and do not 
consider the fact that prices will change with changes in the quantity actions 
of active firms and the entry of new firms . The main theorem shows that for the 
case in which the consumer sector of the economy generates demand of the class 
that is generated by a single consumer , the unique perfectly competitive equilibrium 
is globally stable. 
49. 
Finally , we have shown how this new model of perfect competition can be 
adjusted to include the case .of decreasing returns to scale in the aggregate , 
caused by variation in the quality of the resource that defines the production 
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1Frequently we will be concerned with the interpretation of the ADM model 
rather than the model itself. When we speak of the interpretation we will 
follow Arrow and Debreu and in particular have Debreu 's Theory of Value 11959] 
in mind. McKenzie' s  interpretation of the model is different , and is in fact 
more in the spirit of the synthesis we advance here. 
2Because price taking behavior is explained along the lines of the Cournot 
theory, what we o:ffer might be better teJ:llled a Cournot-Harshall-ADM synthesis. 
It ia also important to acknowledge that small efficient scale and free entry, 
while sufficient to guarantee price taking behavior in the limit, may not be 
necessary (see for example Spence 11983] } .  The extent to which free entry 
alone is sufficient (for the price taking conclusion} is a much debated issue , 
and not one on which our analysis aheda l.igh.t. Suffice it to say that without 
the assumption of small efficien t scale the case for price taking behavior 
becomes less compelling. 
lsee Novsnek [1980] , p. �73-�86 .
4 
Notice we have changed from a usual sequence index E.<°ic> . k=l ,2 • • •
to a continuous index f:Ca } ,  a c(O,l]. Thus we really have a net rather 
than a sequence. 
SThe results for mixed strategies are discussed in Section VIII. 
6 
In general equilibrium several price vectors may ' clear markets for a single 
vector of strategies. Then F is a selection from the "inverse demand" 
co=espondence. We assmne all firms evaluate their profit using the same 
selection F, i.e. they agree on the prices that will arise in any situation. 
7Robust sequences of Bertrand equilibria cannot be found. 
8 
SB. 
Labor has been chosen as numeraire in this example to make it similar to 
the partial equilibrium analysis of Section III. The price vector is F(µ } = 
(l,p(µ } } . For µ near 7/6 there are two other exchange equilibria , with 
prices (l,O}  and (0,1 } ,  but they do not satisfy the continuity and value 
condition (F(7/6} = (1,1} } imposed on F. 
9 
This is an abuse of terminology since "industries" that are different 
I 
(according to our definition} may use the same inputs to produce the same outputs. 
Here an "industry" is just the set of firms with identical tectnologies. 
10 
Given action y "t £ Y .  U { 0} for each t c[ O ,• > .  the ag�regate J J 
production in "industry" j is the (Lebesaue } integral of the individual 
m m 
productions , J y .tdt • The integral J (Y. V {O} }dt is just the set J m 0 J 
of all possib1e0aggregate productions J y .tdt where y .t & Y . \) {O}for all 0 J J J 
t £ [0,m). 
11Even after prices have been normalized, there may be several price 
vectors which clear markets given y. We assume one of the price vectors is 
selected by F. 
12The regularity condition is similar to the condition in optimization 
problems that the second derivative is nonzero. It holds generically (i.e. 
except for a negligible set of cases}. See Novshek and Sonnenschein ( . 1978] 
for details of the regularity condition. 
13 
By differentiably convex preferences we mean preferences which generate 
a twice continuously differentiable demand function. 
59 . 
14 
For every Pareto optimal allocation for f,f.o) , say t ,  there exist 
sequences ( °Jc� and { 5Jc � such that °Jc converges to zero, 5Jc converges 
to t ,  and sk is a feasible allocation for £..c°Jc> for each k For each 
�(°Jc) pick a Pareto optimal allocation , tk ' at which all consumers are at least 
as well off as at 5k , and take a convergent subsequence of the [ tk� • 
If t0 is the limit of the subsequence ,  then every consumer is at least as 
well off at t0 as at t (each consumer weakly prefers tk to 5k and tk 
converges to t0 while sk converges to t ) .  Since t is Pareto optimal for 
f;o) and t0 is feasible in fco> , strict convexity of preferences implies all 
consumers have the same allocation in t0 as in t ,  and the combined 
aggregate production of all "industries" is the same in both allocations . Thus 
the Pareto optimal allocations for the sequence of perfectly competitive economies 
{ C(a)} are precisely the Pareto optimal allocations of the limit economy 
€< O )  (with production aggregated across "industries") • 
� 
This is the ( 1-l ) x ( t-l) matrix with one row and column deleted.
16
observe that the aggregate production set is not assumed to be convex. 
Convexity holds only in the limit economy E,co), and there it is a consequence 
of infinitesimal efficient scale. 
17
In each Cournot equilibrium , F(y) is the perceived price vector that 
will result from production y. Since no firm actually changes output at an 
equilibrium , no post change tatonnement is required . The analysis could 
have been carried out with a subjective t(y) , but we required that F(y) 
actually clear markets . 
18
It is not locally stable for either the first stage tatonnement or for 




If nj = 
0 we assume nj =mu: p(t) - (Yj U {O}) .
20 
Recall that by diff erentiably convex preferences we mean preferences 
which generate a twice continuously differentiable demand function . 
21 
• • • "Globally , "  means starting at any aggregate output at which prices are 
defined . 
22
Increasing returns to scale , due to externalities that are internal to 
an industry but external to firms ( see; for example, Novshek and Sonnenschein 
[1980 ] ) , can also be included in the analysis . 
23 A more restrictive dynamics is considered in which the active firms in any 
industry are all ''more efficient" than any inactive firm , at every time t • 
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